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Abstract
Both normative and many descriptive theories of decision making under risk are based on
the notion that outcomes are weighted by their probability, with subsequent maximization of
the (subjective) expected outcome. Numerous investigations from psychology, economics,
and neuroscience have produced evidence consistent with this notion. However, this re-
search has typically investigated choices involving relatively affect-poor, monetary out-
comes. We compared choice in relatively affect-poor, monetary lottery problems with
choice in relatively affect-rich medical decision problems. Computational modeling of be-
havioral data and model-based neuroimaging analyses provide converging evidence for
substantial differences in the respective decision mechanisms. Relative to affect-poor
choices, affect-rich choices yielded a more strongly curved probability weighting function of
cumulative prospect theory, thus signaling that the psychological impact of probabilities is
strongly diminished for affect-rich outcomes. Examining task-dependent brain activation,
we identified a region-by-condition interaction indicating qualitative differences of activation
between affect-rich and affect-poor choices. Moreover, brain activation in regions that were
more active during affect-poor choices (e.g., the supramarginal gyrus) correlated with indi-
vidual trial-by-trial decision weights, indicating that these regions reflect processing of prob-
abilities. Formal reverse inference Neurosynth meta-analyses suggested that whereas
affect-poor choices seem to be based on brain mechanisms for calculative processes, af-
fect-rich choices are driven by the representation of outcomes’ emotional value and autobio-
graphical memories associated with them. These results provide evidence that the
traditional notion of expectation maximization may not apply in the context of outcomes
laden with affective responses, and that understanding the brain mechanisms of decision
making requires the domain of the decision to be taken into account.
Introduction
Traditional economic theory assumes that choices under risk rest on a trade-off between the
options’ possible outcomes and their probabilities—that is, that outcomes (or some function of
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them) are weighted by how probable they are. This notion of expectation maximization is per-
vasive in the social and behavioral sciences, and underlies not only theories of risky decision
making [1, 2], but also theories of moral judgment, work behavior, social learning, attitude for-
mation, and health behavior [3–7].
Numerous psychological, economic, and neurobiological studies into risky decision making
have provided evidence consistent with the notion of expectation maximization (though there
is also contrary evidence) [8]. Most of these studies have asked people to evaluate options with
relatively affect-poor outcomes—primarily, monetary lotteries [9–14]. Yet, many of the impor-
tant decisions that people face—such as which potentially risky medical treatment to choose
(e.g., chemotherapy) or whom to marry—have relatively affect-rich outcomes. Do these choices
also rest on expectation maximization, and specifically, on the process of weighing of possible
outcomes by their probabilities?
Several behavioral studies have identified differences in decision making between affect-rich
(e.g., involving electric shocks) and affect-poor tasks [15, 16]. Using cumulative prospect theo-
ry [14], Rottenstreich and Hsee [17] argued that these differences could be accommodated by
assuming a more strongly curved probability weighting function for affect-rich choices. A
stronger curvature of the weighting function suggests that the psychological impact of proba-
bilities is diminished, because a change on the probability dimension is not associated with a
proportional change in the decision weight. An alternative account suggests that people in situ-
ations involving affect-rich risks tend to simply focus on avoiding the worst possible outcome
and that, in the process of reaching this goal, the probability of occurrence takes a back seat
[18–20]. A related switch in decision strategy—in which people reorient from focusing on
probabilities in monetary gambles to focusing on outcomes (and, in particular, on avoiding
meaningful potential losses)—has also been proposed for decision makers in whom positive af-
fect has been induced [21]. In sum, the traditional notion of a mechanism that assumes sensi-
tivity to outcome and probability information and expectation maximization may not hold
when options elicit relatively high levels of affect. Instead, qualitatively different strategies may
be used in affect-rich versus affect-poor decisions [20, 22].
Although these accounts make qualitatively different predictions about the neuro-cognitive
mechanisms underlying affect-rich and affect-poor risky choice, they have yet to be tested
against each other. Comparing choices in affect-rich and affect-poor problems, as well as the
neural underpinnings of those choices, would test the generalizability of expectation maximiza-
tion as well as the often implicit assumption that the neuro-cognitive mechanisms of risky
choice are domain general. Moreover, tools for improving decision making in affect-rich con-
texts (e.g., a choice of medical treatments) may need to be designed differently depending on
whether people are sensitive to the probabilities of rare but consequential outcomes (and po-
tentially overweight them) or whether they do without the probability information and the re-
spective weighting process. In what follows, we pit these two accounts against each other.
Materials and Methods
In order to examine the neural underpinnings of cognitive processing in affect-rich and affect-
poor decisions, we asked participants to make choices between two options with relatively af-
fect-rich outcomes (drugs that cause a side effect with some probability) as well as between two
options with relatively affect-poor outcomes (lotteries that incur monetary losses with some
probability) [23, 24]. The monetary losses were matched to each individual’s subjective mone-
tary evaluation of the side effects, permitting a within-subject comparison between affect-rich
and affect-poor choices in otherwise monetarily equivalent problems.
Choosing between Affective Risks
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Subjects
Participants were 23 healthy subjects (mean age = 22.7 years, SD = 2.5, 14 female). The study
was approved by the ethics committee of the University of Oslo’s Department of Psychology
and was conducted at the University of Oslo (Oslo University Hospital). Participants reported
no psychiatric or neurological disorders and gave their informed consent through a form ap-
proved by the ethics committee. They received a CD with images of their brain in appreciation
of their participation. One participant had to be excluded from the fMRI data analysis due to
scanning problems.
Paradigm
As in other studies on affective decision making under risk [15, 17, 19, 25], we used nonmone-
tary outcomes to represent affect-rich stimuli—specifically, adverse medical side effects. Mone-
tary losses (which were matched to the side effects in terms of what individual participants
viewed as their economic equivalents, see below) were used as affect-poor outcomes. In studies
using the same material [23, 24], participants indicated that they would be more upset if they
experienced a side effect than if they had to pay the monetary amount they indicated as being
economically equivalent to that side effect. Following previous research, we thus refer to out-
comes as “affect-rich” and “affect-poor” in relative (rather than absolute) terms. Our paradigm
was modeled on an approach developed by Pachur et al. [23, 24]: Participants were first asked
to indicate the amount of money they considered equivalent to specific nonmonetary outcomes
(here: side effects; Fig 1A). The monetary amounts indicated (willingness-to-pay; WTP) were
then used to construct individualized lotteries in which either a side effect (affect-rich problem)
or a monetary loss (affect-poor problem) occurred with some probability. For example, consid-
er a participant who specified a WTP of $18 to avoid insomnia and $50 to avoid depression. In
the affect-rich problem, she would be presented with a choice between drug A, leading to in-
somnia with a probability of 15% (no side effects otherwise), and drug B, leading to depression
with a probability of 5% (no side effects otherwise). In the corresponding affect-poor problem,
she would be presented with a choice between lottery A, leading to a loss of $18 with a proba-
bility of 15% (nothing otherwise), and lottery B, leading to a loss of $50 with a probability of
Fig 1. Monetary Evaluation Task and Lottery Problems. Experimental design. (A) Participants ranked four
side effects of a drug frommost to least unpleasant; they then indicated their willingness-to-pay (WTP) to
avoid each of these side effects. (B) Next, participants were presented with affect-rich and affect-poor lottery
problems, in which they were asked to choose between two options. In the affect-rich problems (84 choices),
they were presented with two equally effective drugs, each with some probability of a side effect (e.g.,
insomnia with 15%). At each trial, one of the drugs was presented first (for 4 seconds; evaluation phase).
After an interval of 2–9 seconds, both drugs were presented together, and participants indicated their choice
(decision phase). In the affect-poor problems (84 choices), participants were shown the same decision
problems as in the affect-rich problems, but with the side effects being replaced by each participant’s WTP.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0122475.g001
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5% (nothing otherwise). This paradigm allowed us to compare the decision mechanisms un-
derlying affect-rich versus affect-poor risky choice on the basis of lottery problems that were
equivalent in monetary terms (Fig 1A and 1B).
Materials
We used the following four side effects as affect-rich outcomes: fatigue, insomnia, depression,
and memory problems. Participants were presented with three tasks: a monetary evaluation
task, a choice task (involving affect-poor and affect-rich lottery problems), and an affective
evaluation task. In themonetary evaluation task, participants first ranked the four side effects
from most to least unpleasant (Fig 1A). Next, they indicated their willingness to pay (WTP; in
Norwegian kroner) in order to avoid each of the side effects. Specifically, they were asked to
imagine that they were suffering from an (unspecified) illness, needed to take a drug for one
week, and that two possible drugs were available. Both treated the illness equally well, but one
was certain to cause a particular side effect during the week of treatment (e.g., insomnia),
whereas the other caused no side effects. Participants then indicated the amount of money they
would be willing to pay as a markup for the drug without the side effect.
Next, participants were presented with a choice task, consisting of both affect-rich and af-
fect-poor decision problems. In the former, they chose between two drugs, each potentially
causing a particular side effect with some probability (see example above and Fig 1B). In the
latter, they chose between two monetary lotteries, each presenting the prospect of losing a par-
ticular amount of money with some probability. As described above, we constructed these af-
fect-poor problems on the basis of the affect-rich problems, replacing the side effects with the
individual-specific WTPs obtained in the monetary evaluation task. As a result, the affect-poor
problems were equivalent to the affect-rich ones in terms of monetary amounts and probabili-
ties. Each problem involved a choice between two options (drugs or monetary lotteries), with
one option implicating a less severe, but more probable, outcome than the other.
We used four probability levels (low, low-to-medium, medium, and high), with two proba-
bilities representing each level (differing by 0.03), yielding a total of 8 probabilities: 0.05, 0.08,
0.15, 0.18, 0.5, 0.53, 0.95, and 0.98. Using these probabilities and the median WTPs obtained in
a pilot study, we constructed 42 lottery problems consisting of pairs of lotteries with compara-
ble expected values (see S1 Table for a complete list of the problems used. Note that each par-
ticipant was presented with lottery problems containing her ownWTPs; the median WTPs
from the pilot study were used only to construct lottery problems with similar expected values).
The decision problems in each domain were presented twice (see below), yielding a total of 84
affect-rich and 84 affect-poor problems.
Finally, participants were presented with a two-part affective evaluation task. First, each per-
son was asked to imagine that she had lost a bet and would therefore suffer the loss of a speci-
fied amount of money. For each of the monetary amounts that a participant had indicated as
WTPs in the monetary evaluation task, she now indicated, on a scale from 1 (= not upset) to 10
(= very upset), how upset she would be to suffer this loss. Second, she was asked to imagine
that she needed to take a drug and would experience a side effect. For each side effect, she indi-
cated how upset she would be to experience that effect.
Design and Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two between-subjects conditions to control for
order effects (see below). They first completed the monetary evaluation task outside the scan-
ner. In the scanner, they were then asked to render choices between both affect-rich and affect-
poor options. The choice task was spread across three scanning sessions. No feedback
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concerning trial outcomes was given. Each trial in the choice task started with an evaluation
phase, where one option was displayed for 4 seconds (panel B in Fig 1) [26]. In the subsequent
decision phase, both options were displayed, and participants were asked to indicate which they
preferred. This screen was self-paced. Each of the 42 affect-rich and the 42 affect-poor prob-
lems was presented twice, with each of the two options for each problem being presented once
in the evaluation phase. The affect-rich and affect-poor problems were presented in alternating
blocks of three problems from the same domain; within each domain, the problems were pre-
sented in randomized order. Participants entered responses via a button box, with the left but-
ton indicating that they chose the left option on the screen, and the right button, the right
option. The duration of the fixation screens varied randomly between 2 and 9 seconds between
the evaluation phase and the decision phase and between 3 and 11 seconds between the deci-
sion phase and the evaluation phase for the next trial.
The affective evaluation task was again completed outside the scanner; the order of presen-
tation of the monetary amounts and the side effects was counterbalanced across participants.
Overall, we employed a 2 × 2 design, with the domain of lottery problems (affect-poor vs. af-
fect-rich) as a within-subjects factor and the ordering of affect-rich or affect-poor outcomes in
the affective evaluation task (side effects vs. monetary losses) as a between-subjects factor.
Computational Modeling
We used computational modeling to examine the cognitive mechanisms underlying partici-
pants’ decisions in the affect-rich versus affect-poor problems. Specifically, we modeled their
choices using cumulative prospect theory (CPT) [14]. CPT assumes a transformation of objec-
tive outcomes into subjective values and of objective probabilities into decision weights. The
degree of transformation in the value function and the probability weighting function is gov-
erned by free parameters, which are assumed to reflect sensitivity to outcome and probability
information, respectively. CPT was fitted to each individual’s choices separately for affect-rich
and affect-poor problems.
According to CPT, the subjective value of a negative outcome x (note that we only used neg-
ative outcomes) follows from the value function
vðxiÞ ¼ ðxiÞa: ð1Þ
The parameter α is constrained within the range [0,1], yielding a convex value function for
losses (modeling diminishing sensitivity to outcomes). With outcomes 0 x1 . . . xk, and
the corresponding probabilities p1 . . . pk, the weight π given to a negative outcome is the differ-
ence between the probability of receiving an outcome at least as bad as x and the probability of
receiving an outcome worse than x:
pj ¼ wðpj þ . . . pkÞ  wðpjþ1 þ . . . pkÞ: ð2Þ
In Equation 2, w(p) is the probability weighting function, in which objective probabilities are
transformed as follows:
wðpÞ ¼ dp
g
dpg þ ð1 pÞg : ð3Þ
The parameter γ governs the sensitivity to differences in probabilities and is assumed to be in
the range [0,1], with lower values yielding a more inverse S-shaped curvature of the function
(indicating lower sensitivity). Note that, by way of the weighting function, CPT can thus repre-
sent perfect to strongly attenuated probability sensitivity. The parameter δ governs the eleva-
tion of the weighting function and can be interpreted as a measure of risk aversion, with higher
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values indicating more risk aversion (with δ> 0) [27, 28]. The overall valuation V of lottery A
is determined as follows:
VðAÞ ¼
Xk
j¼1
vðxjÞpj: ð4Þ
CPT predicts that the lottery with the more attractive V is more preferred.
To predict the probability pi(A, B) that lottery A is chosen over B in problem i, we used a
choice rule that combines the softmax rule [29] and random guessing [24, 30]:
pðA;BÞ ¼ ð1 gÞ e
VðAÞ
eVðAÞ þ eVðBÞ þ
g
2
; ð5Þ
where the parameter g represents the probability of guessing. Note that softmax is sometimes
used with an additional parameter that governs how sensitively the predicted choice probability
is to the difference in the subjective valuation of the lotteries [31]. We used the choice rule with
only the guessing parameter, because the model ﬁt (based on the Bayesian Information Criteri-
on) [32] was better than that of a choice rule with both parameters or with only the choice
sensitivity parameter.
To reflect the main assumptions of CPT, the parameter values were restricted as follows
[31]: 0< α 1; 0< γ 1; 0< δ 10; 0< g 1. We fitted the model parameters to maximize
the likelihood of the observed choices, using G2 as index of fit (with smaller values indicating a
better fit) [33]:
G2 ¼ 2
XN
i¼1
ln½fiðyjyÞ; ð6Þ
where N is the total number of choices, and f(y|θ) is the probability with which the model with
the set of parameter values θ predicts an individual’s choice y. That is, if lottery A was chosen,
then f(y|θ) = pi(A,B) (with pi(A,B) deﬁned as in Equation 5); if lottery B was chosen, then f(y|θ)
= 1—pi(A,B). In the ﬁtting procedure, we ﬁrst implemented a grid search to identify the combi-
nations of parameter values that minimized G2. The 20 best-ﬁtting value combinations were
then used as starting points for subsequent optimization using the simplex method [34], as im-
plemented in MATLAB.
FMRI Data Acquisition
Functional MRI data were acquired on an Achieva 3 Tesla whole-body MR unit (Philips Medi-
cal Systems) using a standard echo planar imaging sequence with 39 axial slices of 3 mm (field
of view 210 × 210 × 117 mm, 3 × 3 mm in-plane, repetition time 2 s, echo time 30 ms, flip
angle 70°, SENSE factor 2). The field of view was rotated approx. E° relative to the AC-PC line
to improve signal in the orbitofrontal cortex. Three runs of approx. 450 volumes were acquired
(the exact number of volumes depended on the pace with which participants made their
choices), as well as a high-resolution T1-weighted scan directly after the last fMRI sequence
(repetition time 7.1 ms, echo time 3.2 ms, flip angle = 8°, field of view 256 × 256 mm, in-plane
resolution 1 × 1 mm; slice thickness 1 mm [no gap], 160 axial slices).
FMRI Data Analysis
Preprocessing. The fMRI analyses were performed using the FMRIB (Oxford Centre for
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Brain) Software Library (FSL) [35, 36]. Prepro-
cessing of fMRI data involved slice-timing correction, motion correction (Gaussian kernel with
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full width at half maximum of 5 mm), temporal filtering (cutoff = 100 s), and denoising based
on FSL melodic [37]. Denoising was performed as described in Tohka et al. [38]; we fitted deci-
sion thresholds for our study based on “true” signal and noise components manually identified
for 20% (randomly chosen) of the runs. T1 images were skull-stripped using FSL’s Brain Ex-
traction Tool (BET) [39].
Functional MRI analyses. FMRI analyses were first performed for individual runs (auto-
correlation of residuals was reduced through pre-whitening). Statistical maps were first regis-
tered to each individual’s high resolution T1 image with FSL’s Boundary-Based registration
(BBR) tool, and then to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) standard space using linear
and nonlinear transforms with FSL’s Linear Image Registration Tool (FLIRT) and Nonlinear
Image Registration Tool (FNIRT) [40]. Statistical maps in standard space were averaged for
each participant using a fixed effects analysis in FSL’s fMRI Expert Analysis Tool (FEAT). For
one participant, the data of one run was missing; the average was therefore taken for the avail-
able two runs. The final group analysis was performed based on individuals’ averaged runs
using FEAT’s flame 2 and automatic outlier detection [41].
FMRI data were analyzed using the general linear model (GLM) framework. Separate con-
trasts focused on either the evaluation or the decision phase. We nevertheless modeled the
blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) response for both phases in each analysis, because oth-
erwise task-related activation in the phase that was not currently of interest would remain
unmodeled and enter the error term. Each event was modeled by specifying its onset time, its
duration (4 s for the evaluation phase and the response time for the decision phase), and a
weight, which was 1 for intercept regressors and parametric for regressors modeling decision
variables, such as loss magnitude or decision weights. In addition, a regressor for no-response
trials and six motion regressors were included in the analysis. Finally, we included dummy re-
gressors to capture variance due to sudden movements during scanning identified with the
fsl_motion_outliers script. All reported results were tested for significance by first using a z-
threshold of 2.3 (p = .005) and then a cluster-size threshold obtained using the AlphaSim tool
from the AFNI (Analysis of Functional NeuroImaging) program [42]. The cluster-size thresh-
olds were determined based on the volume of the entire brain. Exceptions were analyses re-
garding qualitative differences between brain BOLD responses, where the second test of
contrasts within conjunctions used the conjunction volume to determine the cluster-size
threshold. Further, small volume correction was used for the analysis of amygdala activity (the
small volume was defined as voxels with a probability of at least 5% of being in the amygdala
according to the Harvard–Oxford Probabilistic Atlas). The cluster-size thresholds are reported
in the tables for the respective analyses.
Comparison of affect-poor and affect-rich choices
In the first analyses, we tested for qualitative differences in brain activation between the affect-
rich problems (choices between side effects) and the affect-poor problems (choices between
monetary losses). The core design matrix implemented a factorial design, resulting in six re-
gressors modeling the decision phase of each choice trial.
The six regressors in the decision phase were:
• intercept for overall activity during the decision between side effects (unmodulated);
• magnitude of the side effect of the chosen option (modulated);
• probability of the side effect of the chosen option (modulated);
• intercept for overall activity during the decision between monetary losses (unmodulated);
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• magnitude of the monetary loss of the chosen option (modulated);
• probability of the monetary loss of the chosen option (modulated).
The modulated regressors were orthogonalized with respect to the respective unmodulated
intercept regressors, but not with respect to other modulated regressors, as the latter is not rec-
ommended in the absence of strong theoretical reasons. All regressors were convolved with a
double-gamma hemodynamic response function, and the first derivative of each convolved re-
gressor was added to the model to account for variation in the peak time of the hemodynamic
response function. Orthogonalization and convolution were conducted in the same way for all
fMRI analyses. The same design was used to model the evaluation phase, except that here we
used the magnitude and probability of the presented option.
Domain-general risk processing. To identify brain areas that are activated during risky
choice in general, we conducted a conjunction analysis identifying regions that showed signifi-
cant activation in both affect-rich and affect-poor choice during the decision phase.
Qualitative difference analysis. To investigate whether affect-poor and affect-rich choice
recruit qualitatively different brain circuits, we tested for a region-by-condition interaction
[43]. Again, we first identified regions that showed significant activation in both affect-rich and
affect-poor choice, representing logical conjunction [44]; we then investigated whether there
was a significant number of voxels within these regions that showed greater activation in af-
fect-rich choice, whereas other voxels within these regions showed greater activation in affect-
poor choice. As our focus was on the underlying choice mechanisms, we examined brain acti-
vation during the decision phase.
Neural correlates of differential probability processing. Previous research suggests that
people are less sensitive to probability information in affect-rich than in affect-poor choice. To
examine which regions are involved in the processing of probabilities, we tested in a final anal-
ysis which brain regions’ activity correlated with trial-by-trial decision weights estimated for
each participant individually with CPT, separately for trials with affect-rich and affect-poor sti-
muli. The core design matrix implemented three regressors modeling the evaluation phase.
Note that, in this analysis, the affect-rich and the affect-poor problems were modeled by the
same regressors. The three regressors in the evaluation phase were:
• intercept for overall activity during presentation of the option (unmodulated);
• subjective value of the monetary loss/side effect of the presented option (modulated);
• decision weight for the monetary loss/side effect of the presented option (modulated).
The entries in the decision weight regressor were set to equal the decision weights for the re-
spective outcome (see Equations 2 and 3), using the individually fitted CPT weighting function
(with the respective parameters separately for the affect-rich and the affect-poor problems) and
the probabilities of the respective choice option. The entries in the value regressor were set to
the transformed magnitudes (according to CPT’s value function; Equation 1) using the individ-
ually fitted CPT parameters for affect-rich and affect-poor choices, respectively. In this analy-
sis, we focused on brain activity during the evaluation phase. As only one lottery is presented
in this phase, it is more straightforward to associate brain activation and option-specific infor-
mation [26]. The same design was used to model the decision phase, except that here subjective
values and decision weights of the chosen option—rather than the presented option—
were used.
An alternative approach would be to model the decision weights with two separate regres-
sors for the two domains, and then to contrast them against each other. However, we were
mainly interested in identifying brain regions that showed little variation during affect-rich
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choice (as decision weights were rather similar across different probability levels; see Fig 2)
and, at the same time, covaried with the more variable decision weights for affect-poor choice.
We therefore chose a model that directly implements that assumption. Note that the observed
effect cannot merely reflect greater activation in the affect-poor condition, as the average deci-
sion weight in this condition is lower than in the affect-rich condition (see Fig 2).
Posterior probabilities of terms given activation at a particular location. To establish
the cognitive functions with which the identified regions are most strongly associated (based on
previous studies), we conducted a formal reverse inference analysis, quantifying the association
between brain activation and terms describing perceptual, emotional, cognitive, and motor func-
tions. Our meta-analysis used the tools in the Neurosynth package, but extended the underlying
list of terms and activation location databases (i.e., by adding terms from the Cognitive Atlas and
including activation locations stored in the BrainMap database; S1 Appendix) [45–48]. The Neu-
rosynth meta-analysis resulted in a list of terms (typically describing cognitive/psychological
functions and processes) that have a high posterior probability given a contrast image and can be
considered to provide an unbiased and data-driven picture of the cognitive processes associated
with a contrast. Using the posterior probability to select terms ensures that only those terms are
selected that are consistently associated with activation at a given location and, at the same time,
that this location is rarely reported in articles in which the term is not mentioned. The analysis
thus yields terms with high specificities.
Results
Behavioral Results
Affective evaluation. To assess whether experiencing a side effect was rated as evoking
stronger negative affect than losing the equivalent monetary amount, we analyzed the ratings
Fig 2. Expected Value Choices andWeighting Functions. (A) Median percentage of choices of the option with the higher expected value, separately for
the affect-rich and the affect-poor problems. In each box, the central mark is the median, the edges of the box are the 25th and 75th percentiles, and the
whiskers extend to the most extreme data points. (B) Cumulative prospect theory’s weighting function fitted to the choices in the affect-poor and affect-rich
problems (here, using the average parameter values across all participants; Table 1). Probability levels used in the experiment are shaded. The dotted line
indicates identity of probabilities and decision weights.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0122475.g002
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in the affective evaluation task using a 2 (domain: side effects vs. monetary losses) × 4 (out-
comes) repeated-measures ANOVA (both factors were within-subjects). There was a signifi-
cant main effect of domain, F(1, 22) = 7.01, p = .015, η2p = .24, indicating that the side effects
elicited more negative affect than did their monetary equivalents. This was the case for each of
the four side effects. This finding supports our characterization of the medical side effects as af-
fect-richer than the monetary losses.
Preference reversals. Were the differences in affect associated with different choices? Rep-
licating previous studies [23, 24], our findings showed that, despite the monetary equivalence
between affect-rich and affect-poor problems, people reversed their preferences between the
corresponding problems in 46.07% (SD = 26.7) of cases, on average. An additional analysis
using mixed-effects linear modeling (using the glmer function in the lme4 package in R, with
“participants” and “problems” as random factors and “affect” as a fixed factor) [49] showed
that participants selected the option with the higher expected value 2.05 times more often in
the affect-poor than in the affect-rich choice, b = −0.72, z = −9.99, p< 0.001 (see also Fig 2A).
Computational modeling
To examine the cognitive mechanisms underlying affect-rich and affect-poor choices, we mod-
eled them using CPT. On average, CPT based on individually fitted parameters correctly de-
scribed participants’ choices in 82.45% (SD = 12.39) of affect-rich choices and in 90.42%
(SD = 6.74) of affect-poor choices. Fig 2B shows CPT’s probability weighting function based on
the average best-fitting parameter value (Table 1). First, the probability weighting function was
more strongly curved for affect-rich than for affect-poor choices, signaling lower sensitivity to
probability information in the former than in the latter (as indicated by a lower value on the γ
parameter of the weighting function). Furthermore, 82% (19 of 23) of participants showed
Table 1. Average parameter estimates for cumulative prospect theory obtained in the affect-poor and
affect-rich lottery problems and results of significance testing.
Lottery Problems Signiﬁcance Test for Differences Between Affect-
Rich and Affect-Poor Lottery Problems
Parameters Affect-Poor Affect-Rich t(22) p
γ 0.77 (0.24) 0.43 (0.33) 4.88 <. 001*
δ 0.99 (1.63) 2.47 (3.10) 2.56 = .018**
α 0.73 (0.21) 0.79 (0.26) 0.71 = .480
g 0.07 (0.11) 0.12 (0.19) 1.15 = .261
G2 40.60 (23.86) 59.74 (32.81) 2.07 = .051
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. γ and α model the sensitivity to probabilities and outcomes,
respectively, with higher values indicating higher sensitivity; δ models the elevation, with higher values
indicating higher risk aversion; g indicates the probability of random guessing. The G2 expected under
chance is 116.45.
* Signiﬁcant tests after adopting a Bonferroni-Holm correction [50]. With m = 5 tests, the observed p values
are ﬁrst ordered in ascending order and are then tested with α1 = 0.05/m, α2 = 0.05/(m−1), . . ., αj = 0.05/(m
−(j−1)).
** One-tailed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0122475.t001
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lower probability sensitivity in affect-rich than in affect-poor choices. For 6 participants (26%),
the γ parameter for affect-rich choice was very low ( 0.15), signaling almost complete insensi-
tivity to probability information. Second, the probability weighting function was more elevated
for affect-rich than for affect-poor choices, indicating higher risk aversion in the former.
FMRI Results
First, we identified basic decision making regions that showed significant activation in both af-
fect-rich and affect-poor choices. Second, we investigated whether brain regions that are
known to be involved in affective processing are differentially engaged during affect-rich versus
affect-poor choices. Third, we tested for qualitative differences in task-dependent activation
patterns in the affect-rich and affect-poor problems, which would suggest recruitment of quali-
tatively different decision mechanisms [43]. Fourth, as we did find task-dependent activation
patterns, we examined which, if any, brain regions’ activity correlated with trial-by-trial deci-
sion weights (estimated for each participant individually with CPT, and separately for the af-
fect-rich and affect-poor trials).
Domain-general risk processing. To investigate basic decision making regions, we identi-
fied brain areas that were activated during both affect-poor and affect-rich choice (Fig 3;
Table 2). In addition to visual and association cortices, we found activation in regions typically
recruited during risky choice, including the anterior insula, the thalamus, and the paracingulate
gyrus [10].
Differences in affective processing
To the extent that (as hypothesized) choices concerning side effects imply greater emotional in-
volvement than choices concerning monetary losses, stronger activation can be expected in
brain areas involved in emotion processing. To test this hypothesis, we compared amygdala ac-
tivation (during the decision phase) in the problems involving side effects relative to those in-
volving monetary losses (overall activity during side effect> overall activity during monetary
losses). We indeed found a stronger bilateral activation in the amygdala (Montreal Neurologi-
cal Institute coordinates: X = −14, Y = −8, Z = −12; peak z = 3.71; 24, 6, −18; z = 3.14) during
choice between affect-rich options than during choice between affect-poor options (Fig 4A;
Table 3). To confirm that the activated regions were indeed good indicators of the processing
Fig 3. Brain Activation During Affect-Rich and Affect-Poor Choices. Among other regions, the occipital pole, thalamus, anterior insula and paracingulate
gyrus showed greater activation in both decision making conditions than at baseline.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0122475.g003
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Table 2. Regions activated during affect-rich and affect-poor choices. Clusters with k< 82 voxels are not shown.
Cluster MNI Coordinates k Peak
Signiﬁcance
Anatomical Region
X Y Z
1 –2 –
92
4 6617 6.75 Occipital pole, supracalcarine cortex, intracalcarine cortex
1 0 –
76
0 – 6.62 Lingual gyrus, intracalcarine cortex
1 –
40
–
84
–10 – 6.4 Lateral occipital cortex, inferior division
2 24 –
26
–4 1863 6.07 Right thalamus, right hippocampus
2 –8 –
10
4 – 6.07 Left thalamus
2 0 –
28
–12 – 6.02 Brain stem
3 42 –
38
42 1169 5.84 Supramarginal gyrus, posterior division
3 –
10
–
70
44 – 5.83 Precuneous cortex
3 32 –
66
44 – 5.64 Lateral occipital cortex, superior division
4 6 14 46 954 6.38 Paracingulate gyrus
4 –4 –2 56 – 5.35 Juxtapositional lobule cortex
4 6 28 40 – 5.18 Paracingulate gyrus
5 –
36
–
58
52 863 6.13 Superior parietal lobule, lateral occipital cortex, superior division, angular gyrus
5 –
46
–
40
44 – 5.74 Supramarginal gyrus, anterior division, supramarginal gyrus, posterior division, superior parietal
lobule
5 –
28
–
50
42 – 5.38 Superior parietal lobule
6 30 22 4 442 6.21 Insular cortex
7 –
42
8 36 330 6.42 Middle frontal gyrus
8 44 24 28 322 5.9 Middle frontal gyrus
8 48 38 22 – 4.95 Frontal pole, middle frontal gyrus
9 –
28
22 0 294 6.17 Insular cortex
10 –
46
30 20 207 5.87 Inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis, middle frontal gyrus
11 6 –
38
26 202 5.36 Cingulate gyrus, posterior division
12 36 –
66
–14 97 5.63 Occipital fusiform gyrus
13 –
38
–8 64 87 5.6 Precentral gyrus
Note. Results are based on the Harvard–Oxford cortical and subcortical structural atlases.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0122475.t002
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Fig 4. Differences in Brain Activation During Affect-Rich and Affect-Poor Choices. (A) Greater bilateral amygdala activation for affect-rich choices. (B)
Region-by-condition interaction: Greater activation for affect-rich choices than for affect-poor choices in the posterior cingulate gyrus and the thalamus;
greater bilateral activation for affect-poor choices than for affect-rich choices in the supramarginal gyrus and the superior lateral occipital cortex. Bar plots
show percent signal change for contrasts versus baseline and for high-level contrasts, with error bars indicating 90% confidence intervals. (C) Among other
regions, the supramarginal gyrus, the middle frontal gyrus, and the frontal pole were sensitive to the individually fitted decision weights. (D) Overlap (in green,
displayed are the supramarginal gyrus and the middle frontal gyrus) of activation of affect-poor choice (displayed in B) and regions correlating with
individually fitted decision weights (displayed in C).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0122475.g004
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of emotions, we conducted a formal reverse inference Neurosynth meta-analysis on the Neuro-
synth and BrainMap databases (for details, see Materials and Methods and S1 Appendix) [45,
46], quantifying the association between brain activation and terms describing perceptual,
emotional, cognitive, and motor functions. More specifically, the Neurosynth meta-analysis
yields a posterior probability that a previous study finding activation at a specific location also
investigated a process or function described by the respective term. Following the approach im-
plemented in the Neurosynth toolbox, we report z values from Chi-square tests performed on
posterior probabilities (where higher posterior probabilities and higher term frequency lead to
higher Chi-square and z values). Fig 5 shows that terms such as fear (z = 7.84), fear condition-
ing (z = 7.99), and emotion (z = 6.88) have a high posterior probability given the activation we
observed in the amygdala.
Qualitative difference analysis
To examine choice-dependent brain activation (which would indicate qualitative differences in
the cognitive processes underlying choices in the two kinds of tasks), we tested for a region-by-
condition interaction in brain regions that were active during affect-poor and affect-rich
choices, respectively (Fig 3) [43]. As our focus was on the underlying choice mechanisms, we
examined brain activation during the decision phase. Fig 4B shows the identified region-by-
condition interaction. Voxels in the posterior cingulate gyrus (MNI coordinates: X = −4, Y =
−44, Z = 20; z = 3.14) and the thalamus (−4, −14, 8; z = 3.14) were active in both conditions,
but more so in affect-rich than in affect-poor choice (Table 4). Voxels in the supramarginal
gyrus (bilateral; 50, −36, 44; z = 4.84; −46, −40, 44; z = 4.75) and the superior lateral occipital
cortex (bilateral; 30, −66, 30; z = 3.53; −30, −60, 44; z = 4.24), by contrast, were active in both
conditions, but more so during affect-poor choice (Fig 4B; Table 5). The Neurosynth meta-
analysis suggested that activations during affect-rich choice indicate recruitment of autobio-
graphical memory (z = 4.95), whereas activations during affect-poor choice indicate recruit-
ment of executive functions and calculative processing (z = 4.82; Fig 5).
Neural correlates of differential probability processing
According to the computational modeling analysis reported above, people are less sensitive to
probability information in affect-rich than in affect-poor choice. Further, we found neuroimag-
ing evidence for qualitative differences in task-related activations, with the regions activated in
affect-poor choice being associated with more calculative processing. To examine whether
these regions are indeed involved in probability processing, we implemented a model-based
fMRI analysis. Specifically, we derived regressors for the fMRI analysis from the results of our
computational modeling results (rather than using objective stimulus magnitudes) [51], and
tested which brain regions’ activity correlated with trial-by-trial decision weights (which are
derived from probabilities) estimated for each participant individually with CPT. In this
Table 3. Greater bilateral amygdala activation for the affect-rich than for the affect-poor choices.
Cluster MNI Coordinates k Peak Signiﬁcance Anatomical Region
X Y Z
1 –14 –8 –12 83 3.71 Left amygdala, left pallidum
1 –22 –6 –28 – 2.86 Parahippocampal gyrus, left anterior division hippocampus, left amygdala
2 24 6 –18 75 3.14 Frontal orbital cortex, right amygdala
Clusters with k < 23 voxels are not shown. Note. Results are based on the Harvard–Oxford cortical and subcortical structural atlases.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0122475.t003
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analysis, we focused on brain activity during the evaluation phase, as it is more straightforward
to associate brain activation with option-specific information when only one option is pre-
sented [26]. Brain activation in the supramarginal gyrus (bilateral; MNI coordinates: X = −58,
Y = −44, Z = 42; z = 3.62; 38, −48, 40; z = 3.23), the middle frontal gyrus (bilateral; 50, 16, 36;
z = 3.66; −42, 38, 20; z = 3.33), and the frontal pole (bilateral; 42, 48, −12; z = 3.23; −46, 56, −6;
z = 3.23) correlated with the individual decision weights (Fig 4C; Table 6). A Neurosynth
meta-analysis showed that activations correlating with the individual decision weights indicate
recruitment of arithmetic operations (z = 6.83; Fig 5). These results suggest that the regions
Fig 5. Polar Plot of Cognitive/Psychological TermsWith a High Posterior Probability at Peak Locations of fMRI Analyses. To facilitate the
interpretation of our results while respecting the limits to the validity of reverse inference based on fMRI data, we performed fMRI meta-analyses of 612 terms
describing perceptual, emotional, cognitive, and motor functions based on peak locations reported in 7,500 neuroimaging articles. These meta-analyses
resulted in posterior probability maps, where the value for each voxel is the probability that the process described by a term is recruited, given brain activation
at this voxel (technically, it is the probability that an abstract or title of an article mentions the term, given activation). We used the posterior probability maps to
find the terms with the highest posterior probability at peak locations from our fMRI analyses. The polar plot shows z values derived from Chi square tests of
posterior probabilities. Different contrasts are represented by different colors, and the color transparency indicates the z value of the underlying fMRI contrast
at peak location. The amygdala clusters with greater activation in the affect-rich domain (in purple) have high posterior probabilities for terms indicating
emotional processes. Regions that are active in both domains, but to a greater extent during affect-rich choices (in blue), have higher posterior probabilities
for introspective and memory processes. By comparison, regions more activated in affect-poor choices (in green) have a high posterior probability for mental
calculations, but do not further cluster around a central topic. Finally, areas whose activity correlates with decision weights (in red) have high posterior
probabilities for higher order cognitive functions, including arithmetic operations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0122475.g005
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specifically recruited during affect-poor choice—but less so in affect-rich choice—indeed re-
flect processing of probability information (Fig 5).
Discussion
Numerous accounts of decision making under risk share the common notion that outcomes
are weighted by their probability, with subsequent maximization of the (subjective) expected
outcome. This study demonstrates that the notion of expectation maximization may not apply
in an important domain of decision making under risk, namely in the context of prospects
with emotionally laden outcomes. Taking advantage of a paradigm that allows us to compare
between relatively affect-poor and affect-rich choices, we show that the two to some extent in-
volve qualitatively different cognitive and brain mechanisms.
Specifically, we found systematically different preferences in affect-rich and affect-poor
choice, with the option with the higher expected value being chosen considerably less often
when outcomes were affect-rich than when they were affect-poor. Modeling individuals’
choices using CPT, we found affect-rich choice was best described by a substantially more
strongly curved weighting function than affect-poor choice, signaling that the psychological
impact of probability information is diminished in the context of emotionally laden outcomes.
Put differently, probability information had a lesser impact on option evaluation in affect-rich
choice. These results are in line with the findings of Pachur and colleagues [24], who showed
that, in the context of affect-rich choice, participants seemed to avoid the option associated
with the worse side effects, irrespective of their probabilities, and therefore often ended up
choosing the option with the lower expected value.
Neuroimaging analyses further supported the hypothesis that choices between affect-rich
options are based on qualitatively different cognitive processes than choices between affect-
poor options; the two triggered qualitatively different brain circuits. Affect-rich problems en-
gage more affective processing, as indicated by stronger activation in the amygdala. Further-
more, an examination of task-dependent brain activation revealed a region-by-condition
interaction, which, according to Henson [43], is a stronger indication for the recruitment of
Table 4. Regions with greater activation for the affect-rich than for the affect-poor choices.
Cluster MNI Coordinates k Peak Signiﬁcance Anatomical Region
X Y Z
1 14 –94 –2 5688 5.14 Occipital pole
1 8 –68 32 – 4.69 Precuneous cortex, cuneal cortex
1 –14 –96 24 – 4.61 Occipital pole
2 –4 –44 20 725 5.24 Cingulate gyrus, posterior division
2 –2 –24 30 – 4.08 Cingulate gyrus, posterior division
2 6 –10 34 – 2.52 Cingulate gyrus, anterior division, cingulate gyrus, posterior division
3 22 60 2 206 3.76 Frontal pole
3 36 54 6 – 2.98 Frontal pole
4 46 –54 32 117 3.72 Angular gyrus
4 46 –64 50 – 2.88 Lateral occipital cortex, superior division
5 –2 –30 0 112 3.17 Brain stem, left thalamus
5 –4 –14 8 – 2.98 Left thalamus
6 –28 62 8 74 3.11 Frontal pole
Clusters with k < 65 voxels are not shown. Note. Results are based on the Harvard–Oxford cortical and subcortical structural atlases.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0122475.t004
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separate brain mechanisms than is a double dissociation. To identify the psychological func-
tions most likely recruited in the observed activation, we conducted a formal reverse inference
meta-analysis on the Neurosynth and BrainMap databases, quantifying the association be-
tween brain activation and terms describing perceptual, emotional, cognitive, and motor func-
tions. The results suggested that affect-poor choice is based on calculative processes, whereas
affect-rich choice involves emotional processing and autobiographical memories.
Finally, using model-based neuroimaging analyses we examined whether the regions activat-
ed in affect-poor choice were in fact involved in the processing of probabilities. We found that
brain activation in regions that were more active during affect-poor choice (e.g., the supramargi-
nal gyrus and the middle frontal gyrus) correlated with individual trial-by-trial decision weights.
These results suggest that the regions specifically recruited during affect-poor choice—but less so
during affect-rich choice—indeed reflect processing of probability information.
In sum, our results imply that probabilities seem to impact decisions to a lesser degree in af-
fect-rich than in affect-poor decision making. When a choice elicits strong emotions, decision
makers seem to focus instead on the potential outcomes and the memories attached to them.
These findings have both theoretical and practical implications. On a theoretical level, mod-
els assuming expectation maximization (and implementing the weighting of some function of
Table 5. Regions with greater activation for the affect-poor than for the affect-rich choices. Clusters with k< 65 voxels are not shown.
Cluster MNI Coordinates k Peak
Signiﬁcance
Anatomical Region
X Y Z
1 50 –
36
44 2164 4.84 Supramarginal gyrus, posterior division, supramarginal gyrus, anterior division
1 40 –
48
52 – 4.83 Superior parietal lobule, angular gyrus
1 30 –
66
30 – 3.53 Lateral occipital cortex, superior division
2 –
46
–
40
44 1577 4.75 Supramarginal gyrus, anterior division, supramarginal gyrus, posterior division, superior parietal
lobule
2 –
30
–
60
44 – 4.24 Lateral occipital cortex, superior division, superior parietal lobule, angular gyrus
2 –
28
–
70
60 – 4.21 Lateral occipital cortex, superior division
3 44 –
54
–10 361 5.01 Temporal occipital fusiform cortex, inferior temporal gyrus, temporo-occipital part,
3 36 –
42
–22 – 3.04 Temporal occipital fusiform cortex, Temporal fusiform cortex, posterior division,
4 50 –
74
–4 276 3.72 Lateral occipital cortex, inferior division
4 48 –
80
10 – 2.95 Lateral occipital cortex, inferior division, lateral occipital cortex, superior division
4 32 –
86
–2 – 2.65 Lateral occipital cortex, inferior division
5 –
52
8 30 197 3.71 Precentral gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis
6 48 4 20 191 4.45 Precentral gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis
7 40 38 10 148 3.4 Frontal pole
Note. Results are based on the Harvard–Oxford cortical and subcortical structural atlases.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0122475.t005
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outcome by some function of probability) may fail to accurately predict people’s choices in the
context of emotionally laden outcomes. Instead, alternative modeling frameworks (e.g., simpli-
fying, lexicographic cognitive strategies) may be more appropriate [8, 52]. Our results thus also
support objections to the dominant practice of investigating decision making under risk pri-
marily in the context of monetary lotteries [53] and contribute to domain-specific theories of
risky choice. These objections are not limited to behavioral research, but also pertain to neuro-
imaging research on risky choice. Inspection of recent review articles [54–57] and the 20 most
cited neuroimaging articles on risky choice—identified on May 20th, 2014, on ISI Web of Sci-
ence with the search string “(fmri or neuroimaging) and risk and (decision or choice)”—reveals
that none of these articles considers whether or how the domain of the decision affects risk
preferences. Instead, all of them use (different types of) lottery problems with monetary out-
comes. Our finding of domain-specific decision mechanisms suggests that at least some in-
sights into the brain mechanisms involved in decision making that have been obtained with
relatively affect-poor monetary lottery problems do not easily generalize to the important class
of choice domains that engage emotions, such as decisions about health [18, 23, 24] or, in some
cases, even political decision making [19]. Our findings advance previous research demonstrat-
ing systematic preference reversals between affect-rich and affect-poor tasks [24, 17] by show-
ing that different brain mechanisms are associated with affect-rich and affect-poor choice.
It is instructive to compare our results with a recent meta-analysis on neuroimaging experi-
ments of risky choice. Using an activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis, Mohr
et al. [10] found higher involvement of the right anterior insula, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex,
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and parietal cortex specifically during actual choice relative to
only the anticipation of risky outcomes. To the extent that greater activation of these regions
Table 6. Regions that showed a positive correlation with the individual decision weight (derived from cumulative prospect theory) of the presented
option.
Cluster MNI Coordinates k Peak Signiﬁcance Anatomical Region
X Y Z
1 –58 –44 42 607 3.62 Supramarginal gyrus, posterior division, supramarginal gyrus, anterior division
1 –50 –58 38 – 3.45 Angular gyrus, lateral occipital cortex, superior division
1 –64 –30 44 – 2.9 Supramarginal gyrus, anterior division
2 50 16 36 594 3.66 Middle frontal gyrus
2 40 30 40 – 3.24 Middle frontal gyrus
2 50 6 52 – 2.8 Middle frontal gyrus, precentral gyrus
3 –42 38 20 518 3.33 Frontal pole, middle frontal gyrus
3 –42 8 32 – 3.2 Middle frontal gyrus, precentral gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis
3 –52 14 4 – 3.14 Inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis
4 38 –48 40 346 3.23 Supramarginal gyrus, posterior division, superior parietal lobule, angular gyrus
4 44 –60 48 – 3.21 Lateral occipital cortex, superior division, angular gyrus
4 52 –56 30 – 3.1 Angular gyrus, lateral occipital cortex, superior division
5 –46 56 –6 189 3.23 Frontal pole
5 –50 30 –8 – 2.88 Frontal orbital cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis
5 –44 42 –16 – 2.85 Frontal pole
6 42 48 –12 104 3.23 Frontal pole
6 50 36 0 – 2.45 Frontal pole, inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis
Clusters with k < 82 voxels are not shown. Note. Results are based on the Harvard–Oxford cortical and subcortical structural atlases.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0122475.t006
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reflects processing of probabilities and outcomes during choices between monetary lotteries
(the task used in nearly all studies in the meta-analysis), one might expect them to show greater
activation during affect-poor than affect-rich choice in the present experiment. In fact, we
found most of these regions to be involved in both (Fig 3; Table 2), but that they were not dif-
ferently activated for each kind of choice. One potential reason is that while the research sum-
marized by Mohr et al. used lottery problems with only positive or mixed outcomes, our lottery
problems involved only losses. It is unclear to date whether negative and positive risky out-
comes are processed in the same regions. An alternative possibility is that the regions reported
by Mohr et al.—though consistently activated during risky choice—are not specific to risky
choice. This interpretation is supported by our finding that none of the regions reported in
Mohr et al.’s analysis were identified in a Neurosynth analysis as having a high posterior proba-
bility (which would indicate processing specific to risky choice). More generally, comparison of
our results with summaries of previous neuroimaging studies on risky choice highlights that
past research focused predominantly on monetary lotteries and thus on only a narrow sample
of decision making tasks involving risk. Moreover, the challenge remains to identify regions
that are specifically involved in risk processing, as opposed to regions that are generally in-
volved in decision making.
Although Neurosynth analyses provide unbiased reverse-inference results, it should be
noted that the strength of the conclusions drawn from a Neurosynth analysis is limited by the
quality of the underlying data. In particular, Neurosynth analyses cover a good part but not all
of the neuroimaging literature, are based on peak coordinates and not complete activation im-
ages, and do not include information about specific contrasts. Despite these limitations, Neuro-
synth results for broad cognitive and motivational categories have been found to be consistent
with results from other meta-analyses based on more detailed information about experiments
and contrasts (e.g., the BrainMap database) [46, 47]. Hence, the reverse inference results re-
ported here can be understood as a first exploration of the differences in cognitive processes
that are driven by different brain activation patterns.
As mentioned above, the study of the role of emotions in decision making has a long history
in behavioral and neuroscientific inquiries into risky choice, as evidenced by theories of antici-
pated regret [58–61] and the “risk as feelings” hypothesis [15, 54]. In our view, this approach is
orthogonal to our treatment of the role of affect for decision making. Most of these theories
were developed as alternatives to traditional accounts of decision making under risk and are
thought to describe risky choice independent of decision domain. Our results complement
these theoretical approaches by underlining the importance of emotions in decision making:
domains that are more likely to engage emotions may trigger fundamentally different brain
mechanisms than domains that are devoid of or less rich in emotions.
Further, to the extent that people show strongly attenuated sensitivity to probability infor-
mation (or even neglect it altogether) in decisions with affect-rich outcomes, different decision
aids may be required to help themmake good choices. For instance, professionals who commu-
nicate risks, such as doctors or policy makers, may need to pay special attention to refocusing
people’s attention on the probabilities of (health) risks by illustrating those risks visually
[62, 63].
Conclusion
We compared choice in relatively affect-poor monetary lottery problems with choice in prob-
lems that engage more affective processing. Computational modeling of the behavioral data
and model-based neuroimaging analyses produced converging evidence that affect-rich and af-
fect-poor risky choice to some extent recruit qualitatively different decision mechanisms, on
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both the cognitive and the neurobiological level. Whereas affect-poor choice was sensitive to
probability and recruited brain regions indicative of cognitive and number processing, affect-
rich choice was relatively insensitive to probability and recruited brain regions involved in pro-
cessing emotions and autobiographical memories.
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